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// Copyright 2015-2016 Brian Smith.
//
// Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
// purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
// copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
//
// THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHORS DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES
// WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
// SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
// WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
// OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
// CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
use super::{
bigint::{self, Prime},
verification, RsaEncoding, N,
};
/// RSA PKCS#1 1.5 signatures.
use crate::{
arithmetic::montgomery::R,
bits, digest,
error::{self, KeyRejected},
io::{self, der, der_writer},
pkcs8, rand, signature,
};
use alloc::boxed::Box;
/// An RSA key pair, used for signing.
pub struct RsaKeyPair {
p: PrivatePrime<P>,
q: PrivatePrime<Q>,
qInv: bigint::Elem<P, R>,
qq: bigint::Modulus<QQ>,
q_mod_n: bigint::Elem<N, R>,
public: verification::Key,
public_key: RsaSubjectPublicKey,
}
derive_debug_via_field!(RsaKeyPair, stringify!(RsaKeyPair), public_key);
impl RsaKeyPair {
/// Parses an unencrypted PKCS#8-encoded RSA private key.
///
/// Only two-prime (not multi-prime) keys are supported. The public modulus
/// (n) must be at least 2047 bits. The public modulus must be no larger
/// than 4096 bits. It is recommended that the public modulus be exactly
/// 2048 or 3072 bits. The public exponent must be at least 65537.
///
/// This will generate a 2048-bit RSA private key of the correct form using
/// OpenSSL's command line tool:
///
/// ```sh
/// openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA \
/// -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:2048 \
/// -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_pubexp:65537 | \
/// openssl pkcs8 -topk8 -nocrypt -outform der > rsa-2048-private-key.pk8
/// ```
///
/// This will generate a 3072-bit RSA private key of the correct form:
///
/// ```sh
/// openssl genpkey -algorithm RSA \
/// -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_bits:3072 \
/// -pkeyopt rsa_keygen_pubexp:65537 | \
/// openssl pkcs8 -topk8 -nocrypt -outform der > rsa-3072-private-key.pk8
/// ```
///
/// Often, keys generated for use in OpenSSL-based software are stored in
/// the Base64 “PEM” format without the PKCS#8 wrapper. Such keys can be
/// converted to binary PKCS#8 form using the OpenSSL command line tool like
/// this:
///
/// ```sh
/// openssl pkcs8 -topk8 -nocrypt -outform der \
/// -in rsa-2048-private-key.pem > rsa-2048-private-key.pk8
/// ```
///
/// Base64 (“PEM”) PKCS#8-encoded keys can be converted to the binary PKCS#8
/// form like this:
///
/// ```sh
/// openssl pkcs8 -nocrypt -outform der \
/// -in rsa-2048-private-key.pem > rsa-2048-private-key.pk8
/// ```
///
/// The private key is validated according to [NIST SP-800-56B rev. 1]
/// section 6.4.1.4.3, crt_pkv (Intended Exponent-Creation Method Unknown),
/// with the following exceptions:
///
/// * Section 6.4.1.2.1, Step 1: Neither a target security level nor an
/// expected modulus length is provided as a parameter, so checks
/// regarding these expectations are not done.
/// * Section 6.4.1.2.1, Step 3: Since neither the public key nor the
/// expected modulus length is provided as a parameter, the consistency
/// check between these values and the private key's value of n isn't
/// done.
/// * Section 6.4.1.2.1, Step 5: No primality tests are done, both for
/// performance reasons and to avoid any side channels that such tests
/// would provide.
/// * Section 6.4.1.2.1, Step 6, and 6.4.1.4.3, Step 7:
/// * *ring* has a slightly looser lower bound for the values of `p`
/// and `q` than what the NIST document specifies. This looser lower
/// bound matches what most other crypto libraries do. The check might
/// be tightened to meet NIST's requirements in the future. Similarly,
/// the check that `p` and `q` are not too close together is skipped
/// currently, but may be added in the future.
/// - The validity of the mathematical relationship of `dP`, `dQ`, `e`
/// and `n` is verified only during signing. Some size checks of `d`,
/// `dP` and `dQ` are performed at construction, but some NIST checks
/// are skipped because they would be expensive and/or they would leak
/// information through side channels. If a preemptive check of the
/// consistency of `dP`, `dQ`, `e` and `n` with each other is
/// necessary, that can be done by signing any message with the key
/// pair.
///
/// * `d` is not fully validated, neither at construction nor during
/// signing. This is OK as far as *ring*'s usage of the key is
/// concerned because *ring* never uses the value of `d` (*ring* always
/// uses `p`, `q`, `dP` and `dQ` via the Chinese Remainder Theorem,
/// instead). However, *ring*'s checks would not be sufficient for
/// validating a key pair for use by some other system; that other
/// system must check the value of `d` itself if `d` is to be used.
///
/// In addition to the NIST requirements, *ring* requires that `p > q` and
/// that `e` must be no more than 33 bits.
///
/// See [RFC 5958] and [RFC 3447 Appendix A.1.2] for more details of the
/// encoding of the key.
///
/// [NIST SP-800-56B rev. 1]:
/// http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Br1.pdf
///
/// [RFC 3447 Appendix A.1.2]:
/// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3447#appendix-A.1.2
///
/// [RFC 5958]:
/// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5958
pub fn from_pkcs8(pkcs8: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, KeyRejected> {
const RSA_ENCRYPTION: &[u8] = include_bytes!("../data/alg-rsa-encryption.der");
let (der, _) = pkcs8::unwrap_key_(
untrusted::Input::from(&RSA_ENCRYPTION),
pkcs8::Version::V1Only,
untrusted::Input::from(pkcs8),
)?;
Self::from_der(der.as_slice_less_safe())
}
/// Parses an RSA private key that is not inside a PKCS#8 wrapper.
///
/// The private key must be encoded as a binary DER-encoded ASN.1
/// `RSAPrivateKey` as described in [RFC 3447 Appendix A.1.2]). In all other
/// respects, this is just like `from_pkcs8()`. See the documentation for
/// `from_pkcs8()` for more details.
///
/// It is recommended to use `from_pkcs8()` (with a PKCS#8-encoded key)
/// instead.
///
/// [RFC 3447 Appendix A.1.2]:
/// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3447#appendix-A.1.2
///
/// [NIST SP-800-56B rev. 1]:
/// http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Br1.pdf
pub fn from_der(input: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, KeyRejected> {
untrusted::Input::from(input).read_all(KeyRejected::invalid_encoding(), |input| {
der::nested(
input,
der::Tag::Sequence,
error::KeyRejected::invalid_encoding(),
Self::from_der_reader,
)
})
}
fn from_der_reader(input: &mut untrusted::Reader) -> Result<Self, KeyRejected> {
let version = der::small_nonnegative_integer(input)
.map_err(|error::Unspecified| KeyRejected::invalid_encoding())?;
if version != 0 {
return Err(KeyRejected::version_not_supported());
}
fn positive_integer<'a>(
input: &mut untrusted::Reader<'a>,
) -> Result<io::Positive<'a>, KeyRejected> {
der::positive_integer(input)
.map_err(|error::Unspecified| KeyRejected::invalid_encoding())
}
let n = positive_integer(input)?;
let e = positive_integer(input)?;
let d = positive_integer(input)?.big_endian_without_leading_zero_as_input();
let p = positive_integer(input)?.big_endian_without_leading_zero_as_input();
let q = positive_integer(input)?.big_endian_without_leading_zero_as_input();
let dP = positive_integer(input)?.big_endian_without_leading_zero_as_input();
let dQ = positive_integer(input)?.big_endian_without_leading_zero_as_input();
let qInv = positive_integer(input)?.big_endian_without_leading_zero_as_input();
let (p, p_bits) = bigint::Nonnegative::from_be_bytes_with_bit_length(p)
.map_err(|error::Unspecified| KeyRejected::invalid_encoding())?;
let (q, q_bits) = bigint::Nonnegative::from_be_bytes_with_bit_length(q)
.map_err(|error::Unspecified| KeyRejected::invalid_encoding())?;
// Our implementation of CRT-based modular exponentiation used requires
// that `p > q` so swap them if `p < q`. If swapped, `qInv` is
// recalculated below. `p != q` is verified implicitly below, e.g. when
// `q_mod_p` is constructed.
let ((p, p_bits, dP), (q, q_bits, dQ, qInv)) = match q.verify_less_than(&p) {
Ok(_) => ((p, p_bits, dP), (q, q_bits, dQ, Some(qInv))),
Err(error::Unspecified) => {
// TODO: verify `q` and `qInv` are inverses (mod p).
((q, q_bits, dQ), (p, p_bits, dP, None))
}
};
// XXX: Some steps are done out of order, but the NIST steps are worded
// in such a way that it is clear that NIST intends for them to be done
// in order. TODO: Does this matter at all?
// 6.4.1.4.3/6.4.1.2.1 - Step 1.
// Step 1.a is omitted, as explained above.
// Step 1.b is omitted per above. Instead, we check that the public
// modulus is 2048 to `PRIVATE_KEY_PUBLIC_MODULUS_MAX_BITS` bits.
// XXX: The maximum limit of 4096 bits is primarily due to lack of
// testing of larger key sizes; see, in particular,
// https://www.mail-archive.com/openssl-dev@openssl.org/msg44586.html
// and
// https://www.mail-archive.com/openssl-dev@openssl.org/msg44759.html.
// Also, this limit might help with memory management decisions later.
// Step 1.c. We validate e >= 65537.
let public_key = verification::Key::from_modulus_and_exponent(
n.big_endian_without_leading_zero_as_input(),
e.big_endian_without_leading_zero_as_input(),
bits::BitLength::from_usize_bits(2048),
super::PRIVATE_KEY_PUBLIC_MODULUS_MAX_BITS,
65537,
)?;
// 6.4.1.4.3 says to skip 6.4.1.2.1 Step 2.
// 6.4.1.4.3 Step 3.
// Step 3.a is done below, out of order.
// Step 3.b is unneeded since `n_bits` is derived here from `n`.
// 6.4.1.4.3 says to skip 6.4.1.2.1 Step 4. (We don't need to recover
// the prime factors since they are already given.)
// 6.4.1.4.3 - Step 5.
// Steps 5.a and 5.b are omitted, as explained above.
// Step 5.c.
//
// TODO: First, stop if `p < (√2) * 2**((nBits/2) - 1)`.
//
// Second, stop if `p > 2**(nBits/2) - 1`.
let half_n_bits = public_key.n_bits.half_rounded_up();
if p_bits != half_n_bits {
return Err(KeyRejected::inconsistent_components());
}
// TODO: Step 5.d: Verify GCD(p - 1, e) == 1.
// Steps 5.e and 5.f are omitted as explained above.
// Step 5.g.
//
// TODO: First, stop if `q < (√2) * 2**((nBits/2) - 1)`.
//
// Second, stop if `q > 2**(nBits/2) - 1`.
if p_bits != q_bits {
return Err(KeyRejected::inconsistent_components());
}
// TODO: Step 5.h: Verify GCD(p - 1, e) == 1.
let q_mod_n_decoded = q
.to_elem(&public_key.n)
.map_err(|error::Unspecified| KeyRejected::inconsistent_components())?;
// TODO: Step 5.i
//
// 3.b is unneeded since `n_bits` is derived here from `n`.
// 6.4.1.4.3 - Step 3.a (out of order).
//
// Verify that p * q == n. We restrict ourselves to modular
// multiplication. We rely on the fact that we've verified
// 0 < q < p < n. We check that q and p are close to sqrt(n) and then
// assume that these preconditions are enough to let us assume that
// checking p * q == 0 (mod n) is equivalent to checking p * q == n.
let q_mod_n = bigint::elem_mul(
public_key.n.oneRR().as_ref(),
q_mod_n_decoded.clone(),
&public_key.n,
);
let p_mod_n = p
.to_elem(&public_key.n)
.map_err(|error::Unspecified| KeyRejected::inconsistent_components())?;
let pq_mod_n = bigint::elem_mul(&q_mod_n, p_mod_n, &public_key.n);
if !pq_mod_n.is_zero() {
return Err(KeyRejected::inconsistent_components());
}
// 6.4.1.4.3/6.4.1.2.1 - Step 6.
// Step 6.a, partial.
//
// First, validate `2**half_n_bits < d`. Since 2**half_n_bits has a bit
// length of half_n_bits + 1, this check gives us 2**half_n_bits <= d,
// and knowing d is odd makes the inequality strict.
let (d, d_bits) = bigint::Nonnegative::from_be_bytes_with_bit_length(d)
.map_err(|_| error::KeyRejected::invalid_encoding())?;
if !(half_n_bits < d_bits) {
return Err(KeyRejected::inconsistent_components());
}
// XXX: This check should be `d < LCM(p - 1, q - 1)`, but we don't have
// a good way of calculating LCM, so it is omitted, as explained above.
d.verify_less_than_modulus(&public_key.n)
.map_err(|error::Unspecified| KeyRejected::inconsistent_components())?;
if !d.is_odd() {
return Err(KeyRejected::invalid_component());
}
// Step 6.b is omitted as explained above.
// 6.4.1.4.3 - Step 7.
// Step 7.a.
let p = PrivatePrime::new(p, dP)?;
// Step 7.b.
let q = PrivatePrime::new(q, dQ)?;
let q_mod_p = q.modulus.to_elem(&p.modulus);
// Step 7.c.
let qInv = if let Some(qInv) = qInv {
bigint::Elem::from_be_bytes_padded(qInv, &p.modulus)
.map_err(|error::Unspecified| KeyRejected::invalid_component())?
} else {
// We swapped `p` and `q` above, so we need to calculate `qInv`.
// Step 7.f below will verify `qInv` is correct.
let q_mod_p = bigint::elem_mul(p.modulus.oneRR().as_ref(), q_mod_p.clone(), &p.modulus);
bigint::elem_inverse_consttime(q_mod_p, &p.modulus)
.map_err(|error::Unspecified| KeyRejected::unexpected_error())?
};
// Steps 7.d and 7.e are omitted per the documentation above, and
// because we don't (in the long term) have a good way to do modulo
// with an even modulus.
// Step 7.f.
let qInv = bigint::elem_mul(p.modulus.oneRR().as_ref(), qInv, &p.modulus);
bigint::verify_inverses_consttime(&qInv, q_mod_p, &p.modulus)
.map_err(|error::Unspecified| KeyRejected::inconsistent_components())?;
let qq = bigint::elem_mul(&q_mod_n, q_mod_n_decoded, &public_key.n).into_modulus::<QQ>()?;
let public_key_serialized = RsaSubjectPublicKey::from_n_and_e(n, e);
Ok(Self {
p,
q,
qInv,
q_mod_n,
qq,
public: public_key,
public_key: public_key_serialized,
})
}
/// Returns the length in bytes of the key pair's public modulus.
///
/// A signature has the same length as the public modulus.
pub fn public_modulus_len(&self) -> usize {
self.public_key
.modulus()
.big_endian_without_leading_zero_as_input()
.as_slice_less_safe()
.len()
}
}
impl signature::KeyPair for RsaKeyPair {
type PublicKey = RsaSubjectPublicKey;
fn public_key(&self) -> &Self::PublicKey {
&self.public_key
}
}
/// A serialized RSA public key.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct RsaSubjectPublicKey(Box<[u8]>);
impl AsRef<[u8]> for RsaSubjectPublicKey {
fn as_ref(&self) -> &[u8] {
self.0.as_ref()
}
}
derive_debug_self_as_ref_hex_bytes!(RsaSubjectPublicKey);
impl RsaSubjectPublicKey {
fn from_n_and_e(n: io::Positive, e: io::Positive) -> Self {
let bytes = der_writer::write_all(der::Tag::Sequence, &|output| {
der_writer::write_positive_integer(output, &n);
der_writer::write_positive_integer(output, &e);
});
RsaSubjectPublicKey(bytes)
}
/// The public modulus (n).
pub fn modulus(&self) -> io::Positive {
// Parsing won't fail because we serialized it ourselves.
let (public_key, _exponent) =
super::parse_public_key(untrusted::Input::from(self.as_ref())).unwrap();
public_key
}
/// The public exponent (e).
pub fn exponent(&self) -> io::Positive {
// Parsing won't fail because we serialized it ourselves.
let (_public_key, exponent) =
super::parse_public_key(untrusted::Input::from(self.as_ref())).unwrap();
exponent
}
}
struct PrivatePrime<M: Prime> {
modulus: bigint::Modulus<M>,
exponent: bigint::PrivateExponent<M>,
}
impl<M: Prime + Clone> PrivatePrime<M> {
/// Constructs a `PrivatePrime` from the private prime `p` and `dP` where
/// dP == d % (p - 1).
fn new(p: bigint::Nonnegative, dP: untrusted::Input) -> Result<Self, KeyRejected> {
let (p, p_bits) = bigint::Modulus::from_nonnegative_with_bit_length(p)?;
if p_bits.as_usize_bits() % 512 != 0 {
return Err(error::KeyRejected::private_modulus_len_not_multiple_of_512_bits());
}
// [NIST SP-800-56B rev. 1] 6.4.1.4.3 - Steps 7.a & 7.b.
let dP = bigint::PrivateExponent::from_be_bytes_padded(dP, &p)
.map_err(|error::Unspecified| KeyRejected::inconsistent_components())?;
// XXX: Steps 7.d and 7.e are omitted. We don't check that
// `dP == d % (p - 1)` because we don't (in the long term) have a good
// way to do modulo with an even modulus. Instead we just check that
// `1 <= dP < p - 1`. We'll check it, to some unknown extent, when we
// do the private key operation, since we verify that the result of the
// private key operation using the CRT parameters is consistent with `n`
// and `e`. TODO: Either prove that what we do is sufficient, or make
// it so.
Ok(PrivatePrime {
modulus: p,
exponent: dP,
})
}
}
fn elem_exp_consttime<M, MM>(
c: &bigint::Elem<MM>,
p: &PrivatePrime<M>,
) -> Result<bigint::Elem<M>, error::Unspecified>
where
M: bigint::NotMuchSmallerModulus<MM>,
M: Prime,
{
let c_mod_m = bigint::elem_reduced(c, &p.modulus);
// We could precompute `oneRRR = elem_squared(&p.oneRR`) as mentioned
// in the Smooth CRT-RSA paper.
let c_mod_m = bigint::elem_mul(p.modulus.oneRR().as_ref(), c_mod_m, &p.modulus);
let c_mod_m = bigint::elem_mul(p.modulus.oneRR().as_ref(), c_mod_m, &p.modulus);
bigint::elem_exp_consttime(c_mod_m, &p.exponent, &p.modulus)
}
// Type-level representations of the different moduli used in RSA signing, in
// addition to `super::N`. See `super::bigint`'s modulue-level documentation.
#[derive(Copy, Clone)]
enum P {}
unsafe impl Prime for P {}
unsafe impl bigint::SmallerModulus<N> for P {}
unsafe impl bigint::NotMuchSmallerModulus<N> for P {}
#[derive(Copy, Clone)]
enum QQ {}
unsafe impl bigint::SmallerModulus<N> for QQ {}
unsafe impl bigint::NotMuchSmallerModulus<N> for QQ {}
// `q < p < 2*q` since `q` is slightly smaller than `p` (see below). Thus:
//
// q < p < 2*q
// q*q < p*q < 2*q*q.
// q**2 < n < 2*(q**2).
unsafe impl bigint::SlightlySmallerModulus<N> for QQ {}
#[derive(Copy, Clone)]
enum Q {}
unsafe impl Prime for Q {}
unsafe impl bigint::SmallerModulus<N> for Q {}
unsafe impl bigint::SmallerModulus<P> for Q {}
// q < p && `p.bit_length() == q.bit_length()` implies `q < p < 2*q`.
unsafe impl bigint::SlightlySmallerModulus<P> for Q {}
unsafe impl bigint::SmallerModulus<QQ> for Q {}
unsafe impl bigint::NotMuchSmallerModulus<QQ> for Q {}
impl RsaKeyPair {
/// Sign `msg`. `msg` is digested using the digest algorithm from
/// `padding_alg` and the digest is then padded using the padding algorithm
/// from `padding_alg`. The signature it written into `signature`;
/// `signature`'s length must be exactly the length returned by
/// `public_modulus_len()`. `rng` may be used to randomize the padding
/// (e.g. for PSS).
///
/// Many other crypto libraries have signing functions that takes a
/// precomputed digest as input, instead of the message to digest. This
/// function does *not* take a precomputed digest; instead, `sign`
/// calculates the digest itself.
///
/// Lots of effort has been made to make the signing operations close to
/// constant time to protect the private key from side channel attacks. On
/// x86-64, this is done pretty well, but not perfectly. On other
/// platforms, it is done less perfectly.
pub fn sign(
&self,
padding_alg: &'static dyn RsaEncoding,
rng: &dyn rand::SecureRandom,
msg: &[u8],
signature: &mut [u8],
) -> Result<(), error::Unspecified> {
let mod_bits = self.public.n_bits;
if signature.len() != mod_bits.as_usize_bytes_rounded_up() {
return Err(error::Unspecified);
}
let m_hash = digest::digest(padding_alg.digest_alg(), msg);
padding_alg.encode(&m_hash, signature, mod_bits, rng)?;
// RFC 8017 Section 5.1.2: RSADP, using the Chinese Remainder Theorem
// with Garner's algorithm.
let n = &self.public.n;
// Step 1. The value zero is also rejected.
let base = bigint::Elem::from_be_bytes_padded(untrusted::Input::from(signature), n)?;
// Step 2
let c = base;
// Step 2.b.i.
let m_1 = elem_exp_consttime(&c, &self.p)?;
let c_mod_qq = bigint::elem_reduced_once(&c, &self.qq);
let m_2 = elem_exp_consttime(&c_mod_qq, &self.q)?;
// Step 2.b.ii isn't needed since there are only two primes.
// Step 2.b.iii.
let p = &self.p.modulus;
let m_2 = bigint::elem_widen(m_2, p);
let m_1_minus_m_2 = bigint::elem_sub(m_1, &m_2, p);
let h = bigint::elem_mul(&self.qInv, m_1_minus_m_2, p);
// Step 2.b.iv. The reduction in the modular multiplication isn't
// necessary because `h < p` and `p * q == n` implies `h * q < n`.
// Modular arithmetic is used simply to avoid implementing
// non-modular arithmetic.
let h = bigint::elem_widen(h, n);
let q_times_h = bigint::elem_mul(&self.q_mod_n, h, n);
let m_2 = bigint::elem_widen(m_2, n);
let m = bigint::elem_add(m_2, q_times_h, n);
// Step 2.b.v isn't needed since there are only two primes.
// Verify the result to protect against fault attacks as described
// in "On the Importance of Checking Cryptographic Protocols for
// Faults" by Dan Boneh, Richard A. DeMillo, and Richard J. Lipton.
// This check is cheap assuming `e` is small, which is ensured during
// `KeyPair` construction. Note that this is the only validation of `e`
// that is done other than basic checks on its size, oddness, and
// minimum value, since the relationship of `e` to `d`, `p`, and `q` is
// not verified during `KeyPair` construction.
{
let verify = bigint::elem_exp_vartime(m.clone(), self.public.e, n);
let verify = verify.into_unencoded(n);
bigint::elem_verify_equal_consttime(&verify, &c)?;
}
// Step 3.
//
// See Falko Strenzke, "Manger's Attack revisited", ICICS 2010.
m.fill_be_bytes(signature);
Ok(())
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
// We intentionally avoid `use super::*` so that we are sure to use only
// the public API; this ensures that enough of the API is public.
use crate::{rand, signature};
use alloc::vec;
// `KeyPair::sign` requires that the output buffer is the same length as
// the public key modulus. Test what happens when it isn't the same length.
#[test]
fn test_signature_rsa_pkcs1_sign_output_buffer_len() {
// Sign the message "hello, world", using PKCS#1 v1.5 padding and the
// SHA256 digest algorithm.
const MESSAGE: &[u8] = b"hello, world";
let rng = rand::SystemRandom::new();
const PRIVATE_KEY_DER: &[u8] = include_bytes!("signature_rsa_example_private_key.der");
let key_pair = signature::RsaKeyPair::from_der(PRIVATE_KEY_DER).unwrap();
// The output buffer is one byte too short.
let mut signature = vec![0; key_pair.public_modulus_len() - 1];
assert!(key_pair
.sign(&signature::RSA_PKCS1_SHA256, &rng, MESSAGE, &mut signature)
.is_err());
// The output buffer is the right length.
signature.push(0);
assert!(key_pair
.sign(&signature::RSA_PKCS1_SHA256, &rng, MESSAGE, &mut signature)
.is_ok());
// The output buffer is one byte too long.
signature.push(0);
assert!(key_pair
.sign(&signature::RSA_PKCS1_SHA256, &rng, MESSAGE, &mut signature)
.is_err());
}
}